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REGULATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
A NOTE ON BANKING
Frank H. Easterbrookt
Arrange our principal financial intermediaries from most to
least "troubled." You get: (1) savings and loan associations; (2)
commercial and mutual banks; (3) insurance companies; (4) pension
funds; (5) investment banks; (6) mutual funds. There is a pattern:
the more regulated the intermediary, the closer it seems to the
brink. This is no coincidence. It is all but inevitable and will remain
so no matter how skillful and well intentioned the regulators.'
Regulation means reducing the firm's opportunities. Some
things become illegal; others require permission and are hedged
about with "safeguards"; still others are taxed. Banks do not make
any distinctive product and have no captive customers. All financial
intermediaries assemble capital from persons willing to postpone
consumption (in exchange for a greater payment in the future) and
invest in projects with payoffs that should enable them to fulfill their
bargains with the suppliers of capital. Anything banks can do, other
intermediaries can do. Pension funds and insurance companies finance the same sorts of buildings in which banks invest; investment
banks buy and sell commercial paper that is a substitute for loans
from banks; mortgage brokers make loans to householders; money
market funds issue drafts that work the same as checks. In recent
decades innovations in capital markets have made it easier to assemble capital through mutual funds, to market commercial paper, and
so on; insurers and pension funds have increased in size as vehicles
for deferred consumption.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago. This is a revised version of a talk at the
Federalist Society's Convention on Individual Responsibility and the Law and is © 1992
by Frank H. Easterbrook.
1 I am a consumer rather than a producer of scholarship on this subject and have
borrowed from the thoughts of persons who have given it serious attention. See EDWARD
J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); LAWRENCEJ. WHITE,
THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991);
Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and
Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring,and the Marketfor Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1153 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking.System: The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1991); Kenneth E. Scott, Never
Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. LAW. 1883 (1990). I use their ideas shamelessly
without further citation.
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Banks will prosper only to the extent they retain a comparative
advantage over these rivals in assembling capital and finding attractive investment projects. Yet regulation closes some opportunities
to an institution, increases the cost of seizing other opportunities,
and so diminishes or eliminates that institution's comparative advantage. Capital is mobile and moves to another intermediary.
Regulators can respond in three ways: they may cut down on
regulatory costs; they may "protect" the regulated institution by
playing Handicapper General and imposing regulatory disadvantages on other institutions in order to create a "level playing field";
or they may dole out subsidies that recreate profits in the regulated
institution at some cost to taxpayers and economic efficiency. Banking regulation has done a little of each. Banks have been allowed to
offer competitive interest rates and to operate some affiliated businesses. Legislatures have constrained the behavior of banks' rivals.
And deposit insurance serves as a mighty subsidy, now hundreds of
billions of dollars.
Reductions in regulation promote efficient capital markets but
carry with them high risk of failure (competition is a ruthless
pruner). Extension of regulation to other institutions does the reverse-and by cutting down on the comparative advantage of some
other institution causes money to flee once again and creates a demand for still more regulation at capital's new destination. In the
limit capital flees the nation. Nothing Congress can do will create
restrictions abroad, and capital does not respect borders. Nations
that have tried to imprison capital by making their currencies nonconvertible have failed, and by interfering with the accumulation
and investment of funds these nations have eliminated any prospect
of economic growth. Because the United States offers a shrinking
portion of the world's investment opportunities, the power of the
federal government to regulate financial intermediation declines
daily-although its power to transfer wealth among institutions remains. As for subsidies: these can restore paper profits for a while,
but they disguise the underlying inefficiency of the sector and attract
money that erodes the profits and in the end saddles the subsidizer
with ever-larger losses. We are experiencing this phenomenon in
the savings and loan industry and should keep in mind Santayana's
aphorism that "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to fulfil it."2
Our savings and loan business shows the process at work, and
in its terminal phase. Banks (including S&Ls) have had a compara2

GEORGE SANTAYANA,

I LIFE OF REASON

ch. 12 (1906).
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tive advantage in assembling capital at retail and investing in assets
such as real estate and small businesses that financial markets do not
value very well (because each parcel and firm is different). Hiring
capital from scattered small investors and lending to closely held
corporations and purchasers of real estate creates a maturity mismatch: the S&L or bank borrows in the short-term market and lends
in the long-term market. By contrast, insurance companies and
pension funds borrow and lend long, while mutual funds borrow
and lend short.
A maturity mismatch creates distinct problems of illiquidity and
valuation. Withdrawals can force a bank or S&L to sell illiquid assets at distress prices, and the prospect of such sales means that
those who get out first emerge whole while the losses fall on those
who linger. Thus the potential for "runs" and associated failures.
Central banks can mitigate the problem by lending against the assets, avoiding the need for their immediate sale. And banks themselves can and do deal with liquidity problems by selling their loans
in secondary markets, such as the mortgage pools assembled by
Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac. Pooled investments are not an unmitigated boon, however: pools erode the banks' comparative advantage by enabling persons to invest in real estate loans and the like,
bypassing banks entirely. The S&L becomes a placement and collection agent while the investors who purchase interests in the pools
supply the capital.
Steps to deal with the liquidity problem aggravate the valuation
problem. Long-term loans at fixed rates are highly sensitive to
changes in the social interest rate. Inflation or any other reason for
higher interest does two things at once: it increases the price the
bank must pay in the short-term market to hire money, and it diminishes the capital value of its portfolio of loans. Liquidity through
mortgage pools and the like makes this capital loss evident immediately; the price of interests in the pool drops as interest rates rise,
and the reverse. Selling these interests and generating instant cash
simply realizes the loss faster.
None of this would be troubling but for one thing: banks' and
S&Ls' liabilities are in nominal dollars. When the value of assets in
a mutual funds falls, investors absorb the loss and the fund itself is
unaffected; so too with defined-contribution pension plans. Insurance companies hedge against investment losses by retaining discretion over returns credited to the policy, and even defined-benefit
pension plans cope by promising benefit levels that they fully expect
to adjust upward if the investments have their expected return; a
shortfall means less or no increase in benefits. Banks and S&Ls
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promise fixed dollars; any shortfall means failure and a transfer of
liabilities to the insurance fund.
Public insurance, created in part to discourage runs, also
reduces the risk of placing money with a bank or S&L. It leaves
depositors no reason to monitor the riskiness of their investments.
If all investments in banks are equally risky, why not go to the one
offering the highest interest-and coincidentally the highest risk to
the fund? When risky banks can attract money as easily as sound
ones, too much capital flows to the hands of inferior managers. Failure is the wedge to separate good from bad; capitalist economies
rely on failure to improve efficiency. When we use public funds to
create a no-risk, no-failure sector of the economy, we purchase extra
(but disguised) risk and failure. Deposit insurance subsidizes failure, obtaining the cash by taxing success in and out of the financial
services industry. Subsidy creates more of the thing subsidized and
less of the thing taxed; we produce more failure and less success.
With insurance comes strings, to hold down the cost of the subsidy. Regulators require banks to have a specified net worth (a cushion under the public commitment), restrict investment in assets
deemed especially risky, and so on. Unfortunately such controls
may backfire. A command to infuse new capital into a S&L may induce the investors to abandon it instead. An obligation to hold a
narrow portfolio of safe investments paradoxically may increase risk.
A loan secured by a mortgage on a parcel of real estate is safe individually; the security interest assures that. But a portfolio of residential loans, although safe against default, is highly sensitive to
changes in interest rates. They are safe individually and risky in the
aggregate. Perhaps the worst thing that can happen to an S&L is for
the rates to rise and all of its customers to pay off their loans; the
capital loss is large.
Regulations induce S&Ls (especially) to invest in narrow portfolios of similar assets. Portfolios of similar investments have high
covariance and are exceedingly risky. To avoid the interest-rate risk
an intermediary must invest in assets with low (even negative)
covariance. Yet such investments also enable the institution to
avoid regulatory scrutiny; the regulator cannot tell whether the investment strategy has been designed to transfer excess risk to the
insurance fund. Freedom in selection of assets gives bank regulators fits. Therefore they discourage (and Congress sometimes forbids) the kind of diversification that modem portfolio theory defines
3
as essential to prudence!
3

See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT

MAN RULE (1986) (collecting sources).
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Other "safeguards" such as net worth standards are pointless
when the firm has no net equity. As new capital inures to the benefit
of the Treasury, the investors swallow their losses and move on;
sunk costs cannot be retrieved. Manipulation-phony capital-is of

course more attractive. Regulators may even create it to make
themselves look good. Banking regulators approved a set of accounting conventions that can be charitably described as odd (the

uncharitable description is also unprintable), to which they added a
new kind of "goodwill": the capital shortfall of an acquired bank is
treated as an asset on the acquiring bank's books, to be amortized
over 15 or more years. Only a regulator can turn a liability into an
asset by the stroke of a pen. Flim-flam of this sort, when practiced
in the private market, lands entrepreneurs in jail. It is not hard to
imagine what the SEC would say if an issuer of securities listed such
an "asset" on its books.
Back to the maturity mismatch. If interest rates rise, the capital
value of the portfolio falls, and the reverse. In the late 1970s interest rates rose dramatically. By 1981 the net worth of the S&L industry was a negative $100 billion.4 S&Ls could try to ride out the
troubles and wait for rates to fall. Rates did fall during the 1980s,
and a substantial majority of institutions weathered the storm. But
it was not easy to sit tight during what Edward Kane has called the
Zombie Bank phenomenon: the walking dead S&Ls feed on the
living.
Investors in an S&L with negative net worth have been wiped
out. They could walk away-but they need not. Still in control of
the institution, they can jack up the risk. They have the equivalent
of warrants on the upper tail of the distribution; the taxpayer covers
all loss. If a high-variance strategy pays off, the investors reap the
gains; if it doesn't, they have lost nothing. So they make high risk
loans, getting the business by charging the borrower less than a
sound rate of interest. Shaving the rate of interest in this way depresses the returns available to soundly managed S&Ls. Where do
the Zombies get the money to invest? They offer higher returns to
depositors. Freed by deposit insurance of the risk of nonpayment,
the depositors are happy to oblige. Brokered deposits assemble
some of the money, but cash flows to higher bids with or without
brokerage. Again this siphons money away from sound institutions,
which find themselves squeezed at both ends. Zombie banking
harms more than the investors in sound banks. It injures society at
large by diverting too much money to marginal projects. And by
drawing money into these projects, it puts pressure on the next
4

An average of the estimates in KANE, supra note 1, at 75, and R. DAN
(1988).

JR., THRIFrs UNDER SIEGE 50
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layer of financial intermediaries. Its profits decline, and the ailment
spreads.
In most sectors of the economy, firms with negative net worth
are washed through bankruptcy and their assets released for more
productive endeavors. Not so in banking. The bankruptcy laws do
not apply; regulators seek to postpone the day of reckoning in order
to reduce claims on the insurance fund or to serve their patrons.
Discretion invites political influence. Forbearance in the hope of revival characterizes the regulatory sector, which plays the same
double-or-nothing strategy as the Zombies themselves.
Some of the Zombies will get lucky, but, as the strategy has a
negative present value at each institution, the effect across hundreds
of S&Ls is substantial, and the Treasury pays. The bill came due in
1989. Congress does not part with $100 billion and up without exacting a toll in the form of additional regulation. For example, it
required S&Ls to invest a greater portion of their assets in real estate and to get rid of subordinated debentures ("junk bonds").
That change made regulatory oversight easier and made each loan
safer-but the S&Ls' portfolios are less safe, because there will be
greater covariance. Rearranging portfolios damaged adjacent sectors. Pressure to sell off debentures depressed their price and made
them less liquid, to the detriment of other institutions (banks, insurance companies, university endowments) holding them, and to the
detriment of entrepreneurs in need of capital. 5 Pressure on the next
tier of financial intermediaries may cause the cycle to repeat.
What do we learn? How do we avoid a repetition? Let us hope
that the central lesson is that regulation and subsidy defer but ultimately enlarge the costs of failure. Assembling and deploying capital efficiently is essential to prosperity. Let us rejoice in, rather than
squelch, the comparative advantages of the different intermediaries.
There are at least four ways to enjoy rather than suppress the economic advantages of banks.
1. End the subsidy of deposit insurance and the associated
regulation designed to protect the public fisc. Let bankruptcy separate good from bad. In the United States before deposit insurance
was introduced during the New Deal, depositors lost an average of
0.21% of their investments during bank failures.6 Investors accept
such losses routinely in stock and bond markets; the DowJones In5 See Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 183 (1991).
6 George G. Kaufman, Implications of Large Bank Problems and Insolvenciesfor the Banking System and Economic Policy 5 (Staff Memorandum No. 85-3, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, 1985).
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dustrial Average fluctuates more than that every day. Depositors
can reduce even this small exposure by diversifying across banksjust as they are already diversified across investments by owning real
estate, insurance, and pension plans. Remaining risk may be spread
by private insurance.
This conference is about individual rights and responsibilities.
Making investors responsible for their choices is attractive on moral
as well as economic grounds. We allow persons to select occupations, places to live, spouses, and so on, reaping the rewards and
bearing the risks of failure and regret even though these are both
harder to diversify and much larger than their exposure in banking
transactions. Individual rather than socialized choice and reward
(or penalty) has produced great gains. Let pensions and the Social
Security system serve as the safety net. The economic boon from
more efficient financial intermediation will swamp the small losses in
particular failures.
2. If deposit insurance, as a way to protect improvident (=
undiversified) persons from themselves, remains an imperative in
the United States, then set prices for the insurance correctly.
Zombies forced to pay the real costs of their activities will return to
their graves quickly.
There are good and bad ways to price insurance. Regulatory
risk assessment-classifying the general riskiness of different investments and charging more for insurance as risk rises-is a formula
for disaster. Putting loans in categories is discretionary, imprecise,
and ultimately misguided. It is impossible to overstate the importance of both diversification (rather than concentrating in loans that
are "safe" only when viewed one at a time) and the elimination of
official discretion (to cut politics out of banking).
Markets can supply risk assessments free of charge to the government. Congress could require banks and S&Ls to issue debentures subordinated to all other claims. The interest rate implicit in
the price realized for the instruments would give the market's estimate of the riskiness of the bank.7 Or Congress could cut public
insurance to 90% of deposits and require banks to insure the other
10% in the private market; the price charged to each bank for private insurance could be used as the price for public deposit
insurance.
Markets are of course imperfect-people who influence market
prices are fallible and short of information-but are superior to regulatory alternatives. Markets pool the information of many inter7 See Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance-TheAppropriate Roles for State and Federal
Governments, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 27, 35 (1987).
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ested persons, whose financial exposure induces them to do the best
they can when making bids. Regulation relies on the guess of a few
people whose wallets are not at risk. 8 The difference in accuracy is
substantial. Interest rates on uninsured deposits in the United
States vary by more than 200 basis points, in just the direction that
risk implies. Equity prices of troubled financial intermediaries fall
six to eighteen months before regulators put the banks on the problem list (a step that itself long precedes serious action). When
"problem lists" are leaked to the press, prices of the banks' securities do not move; they already impound the value of the information. Markets look pretty good compared with, say, the predictions
of banking regulators during the 1970s and 1980s. 9
3. The maturity mismatch creates the perceived need for insurance and regulation. A third possibility, then, is to eliminate the
maturity mismatch-to make banks more like money market
funds.1 0 Congress could limit deposit insurance (and perhaps the
right to use the word "bank") to institutions whose deposits are
fully secured by liquid instruments, such as Treasury securities,
commercial paper, or shares in mortgage pools. Both the risk and
the need for oversight of such "narrow banks" are minimal. Incautious investors would be secure without the need for (substantial)
public subvention; other persons could assemble and deploy capital
without the regulatory strings now in place.
4. Most of the rest of the developed world uses a completely
different solution: the "broad bank," a diversified institution combining commercial with investment banking, free to put capital into
equity as well as debt.'1 Rates of bank failure in Europe and Japan
are low; diversification protects depositors. Banks that can invest in
financial instruments of all kinds need not prefer debt over equity.
8 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation,and the Regulation offutures Markets, 59J. Bus. S103, S114-16, S122-26 (1986).
9 Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 1, at 1197-98, collect a lot of this
evidence.
10 See Blueprintfor RestructuringAmerica's FinancialInstitutions: Report of a Task Force
(Brookings Institute, 1989) (reflecting the contributions of George J. Benston, R. Dan
Brumbaugh, Jr., Jack M. Guttentag, Richard J. Herring, George G. Kaufman, Robert E.
Litan, and Kenneth E. Scott).
11 See, e.g., Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Sharfstein, The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of FinancialDistress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1990); David G. Litt,
Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Edward L. Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and FinancialMarkets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwritingin the United States andJapan,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 369 (1990); Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and
Corporate FinancialBehavior in the United States andJapan, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 43 (1990); J.
Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection inJapan,20
J. LEG. STUD. 91 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund
Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on
Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990).
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Today a bank in the United States must try to persuade its clients
that more debt is a Good Thing; banks in Japan or Germany may
buy equity when that is the prudent course for the client and the
bank itself. This is how the banking industry developed in the
United States too-suggesting the economic value of such institutions. Until the forcible dismantling of the industry by the GlassSteagall Act and related legislation in the 1930s, we prospered with
the assistance of broad banks. Much of the regulatory legislation
from that era has been repealed; perhaps it is time for us to rejoin
the rest of the developed world in banking too.
A brief recap. In a world of free-flowing capital, the best-intentioned efforts, carried out by the most conscientious regulators, are
likely to shift and increase costs of failure simultaneously. Thoroughgoing regulation by incorruptible public servants may be the
most fearsome of all, for it stifles competition most completely.
Regulatory handicaps on one institution cause capital to flee; the
handicapped institution may be propped up for a while, but a
delayed fall is a bigger fall.
More reliance on competition and diversification, and less on
regulation, will turn off the spigot attached to the Treasury and will
improve the efficiency of financial intermediation. Coinsurance, risk
rating, narrow banks, broad banks-all rely on the market. Risk is
borne by those who create it (and who have something to gain)
rather than spread to the public at large. Markets reflect individual
rather than collective responsibility and produce a pleasant overlap
between moral and economic understandings.
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